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AVOIDING SORROW IN MORROW: A 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD EXIST 
BETWEEN A SCHOOL AND ITS STUDENTS 
Abstract: In 2013, in Morrow v. Balaski, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that a school did not have a constitutional duty to protect two stu-
dents from being bullied. The court reasoned that no special relationship existed 
between the school and the students and the school’s actions did not create the 
harm that was inflicted on the students. This Comment argues that courts should 
find a special relationship between a school and its students when a school’s be-
havioral restrictions render the students dependent on the school for their safety. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not generally 
compel the state to protect individuals from harm by third parties.1 Although 
the state itself cannot infringe on an individual’s liberty without due process, 
the state generally has no constitutional duty to protect individuals from pri-
vate citizens doing so.2 There are two exceptions to this rule, however: when a 
special relationship exists between the state and the individual, or when the 
state’s affirmative action creates or enhances the risk of harm to the individu-
al.3 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, 
held in Morrow v. Balaski that the state did not have a duty to protect two stu-
dents, as the public school did not have a special relationship with the students, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow III), 719 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir.) 
(en banc) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)) 
(“[A]s a general matter, . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply 
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013). 
 2 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195–97; Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 166. 
 3 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–201; Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 167, 177; Bright v. Westmoreland 
Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 
F.2d 1364, 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 
366 (6th Cir.) (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect 
individuals from private actors except when special relationships exist or when a state’s affirmative 
acts increase the risk of harm), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 282 (U.S. 2012); Campbell v. State of Wash. 
Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that a state’s failure to 
protect private citizens does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless the special relationship or 
state-created danger exception applies); Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827–
28 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the Due Process Clause does not impose a duty on the state to pro-
tect individuals from each other unless the state has a special relationship with the individual or the 
state affirmatively places the individual in a situation of danger they would not otherwise be in). 
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and that the school’s discretion in implementing its disciplinary policies did 
not amount to an affirmative action that enhanced the risk of harm.4  
This Comment argues that a school should have a constitutional duty to 
protect its students when a school—through its policies and decisions—
prevents children from protecting themselves while at school.5 Part I of this 
Comment provides an overview of the scope of a state’s constitutional duty to 
protect individuals from harm by third parties and reviews the facts and proce-
dural history of Morrow.6 Part II reviews the majority’s rationale, and the dis-
sent’s contentions, for the holding that the state did not have a constitutional 
duty to protect the students.7 Finally, Part III argues that courts should find a 
special relationship between a school and its students when its policies and 
decisions place restrictions on students during the school day.8 
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: WHEN THE STATE HAS  
A DUTY TO PROTECT 
A. The State Has a Duty to Protect Individuals When There Is a Special 
Relationship or When the State Creates the Danger 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons 
from harmful state actions regardless of whether the state acted according to 
fair procedures.9 If a state violates this right, or any other right secured by the 
U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States, the affected individual may 
bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 In 1989, however, in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 171–72, 178–79. 
 5 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 188 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); infra 
notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 9–42 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 43–62 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (distinguishing between the 
substantive and procedural due process components of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125) 
(noting that a substantive due process claim protects individuals against government action “regard-
less of the fairness of the procedures”); see also Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 166. The Due Process Clause 
provides that the state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Protecting persons from harmful state action is referred to as 
“substantive” due process. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. 
 10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 165–66; Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806. Section 
1983 protects individuals from any deprivation of their constitutional rights by a person acting under 
color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 claims must establish what right has been al-
legedly violated and whether there has been any deprivation of that right. See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 
165–66. 
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held that, as a general matter, a state’s failure to protect an individual from 
harm by third parties does not violate the Due Process Clause.11 
Nevertheless, some federal appeals courts recognize two limited excep-
tions that compel the state to protect an individual from harm by third parties.12 
First, the state has an affirmative duty to protect when a special relationship 
exists between an individual and the state.13 A special relationship exists be-
tween the state and an individual when the state takes the individual into its 
custody and holds the person against her will.14 The duty to protect arises from 
the state’s restraint of the individual’s liberty, which prevents the person from 
providing for her own protection.15 In the public school context, however, fed-
eral appeals courts have declined to recognize a special relationship between 
public schools and students because schools do not exercise sufficient restraint 
over students.16 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 200–01 (noting that only in limited circumstances does a state 
have a duty to protect); Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 167. 
 12 See, e.g., Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 167; Pahssen, 668 F.3d at 366; Campbell, 671 F.3d at 842, 
845; Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827–28. 
 13 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198, 199–200; Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 167. 
 14 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200–01; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370. An actor that takes an 
individual into custody has a duty to control the conduct of third parties to prevent harm if the actor 
(a) knows or has reason to know of their ability to control conduct of third parties, and (b) knows or 
has reason to know of the necessity and opportunity for control of third parties. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965). This rule is applicable to those in charge of public schools, includ-
ing teachers. See id. § 320 cmt. a; Daniel B. Weddle, You’re on Your Own, Kid . . . But You Shouldn’t 
Be, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1083, 1092–93 (2010) [hereinafter You’re On Your Own, Kid] (explaining that 
the inclusion of educators in section 320 of the Restatement of Torts is reasonable because students 
are compelled by law to attend school, forced to matriculate with other students who may harm them, 
and cannot protect themselves in the absence of their parents). 
 15 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (explaining that the state’s restraint of the individual’s ability to 
act on his or her own behalf, not its failure to protect, triggers constitutional protection); see also 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (explaining that the state has a duty to provide for an 
involuntarily committed person’s basic needs and safety); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) 
(explaining that the state has a duty to provide for a prisoner’s medical needs); Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 
167–68 (noting that it is clear from DeShaney that a state’s duty to protect comes from limitations 
placed on an individual’s freedom). 
 16 See, e.g., Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 170 (explaining that other federal appeals courts’ decisions 
reinforce the Morrow III court’s decision not to recognize a special relationship); Doe v. Covington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming precedent stating that a school does 
not have a special relationship with its students); Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 973–74 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that compulsory attendance and the school’s status of in loco parentis does not 
create a special relationship); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that state-mandated school attendance does not create such a restrictive custodial relationship 
to impose a duty to protect). For example, in the 1992 case D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical School, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the state’s 
compulsory school attendance laws and the school’s in loco parentis authority over students amounted 
to the necessary physical custody during school hours. 972 F.2d at 1371–72; see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 858–59 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in loco parentis as “[o]f, relating to, or acting as temporary 
guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent”). 
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Second, a state has an affirmative duty to protect individuals from harm 
when the state’s actions create the danger that caused the harm.17 To trigger 
this duty under the state-create danger theory, four requirements must be met: 
(1) the harm is foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state’s action “shocks the 
conscience;” (3) the individual is a foreseeable victim; and (4) the state’s af-
firmative action renders the individual more vulnerable than if the state had not 
acted.18 Notably, the fourth factor implies that the state must take an affirma-
tive action to create the danger, rather than merely failing to exercise its au-
thority.19 In other words, the state creates an opportunity for harm that would 
otherwise not exist.20 
B. The Morrows’ Due Process Claim 
A series of threats and physical assaults from a fellow student Shaquana 
Anderson at Blackhawk High School in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, led sis-
ters Brittany and Emily Morrow to bring a cause of action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against the school district and the Assistant Principal, Barry 
Balaski.21 On January 5, 2008, Anderson threatened Brittany by phone and 
online via MySpace.22 Two days later, Anderson physically attacked Brittany 
in the lunchroom of their high school.23 In accordance with its “No Tolerance 
Policy,” the school suspended Brittany and Anderson for three days.24 Ander-
son was then charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment.25 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 167, 177; Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 
1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 18 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 177; Bright, 443 F.3d at 281; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208–09. These 
particular elements of the state-created danger theory are specific to Third Circuit cases. See Morrow 
III, 719 F.3d at 177; Bright, 443 F.3d at 281; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208–09. 
 19 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; Bright, 443 F.3d at 282; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374. 
 20 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 177–78; Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 197 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that the fourth factor examines whether the state used its authority to create harm that 
would not otherwise exist); see also Chris W. Pehrson, Bright v. Westmoreland County: Putting the 
Kibosh on State-Created Danger Claims Alleging State Actor Inaction, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1043, 1061–
62 (2007) (explaining that, after the 2006 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision Bright 
v. Westmoreland County, the fourth prong requires the state to take an affirmative action that causes 
the individual to be in greater danger than if the state had not acted). 
 21 See Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow I), No. 10-292, 2011 WL 915863, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 
2011), aff ’d, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 22 Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow IV), 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013) 
(No. 13-302), 2013 WL 4822221, at *4 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiora-
ri] (explaining that Anderson posted a note online stating she was going to “kill Brittany” and made 
the threat over the telephone later in the day with Emily). 
 23 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *1. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at *1. 
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Despite these charges, Anderson returned to school, where later that month, 
she attempted to throw Brittany down a set of stairs.26 
On April 9, 2008, a juvenile court placed Anderson on probation and or-
dered her to have no contact with Brittany.27 In September, Anderson was ad-
judicated as delinquent based on assault charges and was again ordered to have 
no contact with Brittany.28 Both no contact orders were provided to the school 
and to Assistant Principal Balaski.29 Although the school’s policies required 
expulsion when students commit criminal acts on school grounds or at school 
activities, Anderson remained in school and continued to attack the Morrows.30 
The school indicated it could not guarantee Brittany and Emily’s safety, and 
recommended that the sisters should transfer to a different high school.31 
After these incidents, Brittany and Emily brought a § 1983 claim against 
the school district and Balaski in the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania.32 The Morrows alleged that the defendants violated their 
substantive due process rights to be free from harm and to a public education.33 
The Morrows argued that the school’s compulsory attendance laws and its 
knowledge of the no contact orders created a special relationship with the Mor-
rows and thus a duty to protect them from Anderson.34 Additionally, the Mor-
rows argued that ignoring the school’s own expulsion policy and allowing An-
derson to return to school created a danger that would not have otherwise ex-
isted.35 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that, as a mater of law, the 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. at *2. Anderson also called Brittany a “cracker” and “retarded,” stating that Brittany “had 
better learn to fight back,” and asked Brittany, “[W]hy don’t you learn to talk right.” Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.; Brief and Appendix for Appellants Volume I of II (Pages A1–A16) at 5, Morrow III, 719 
F.3d 160 (No. 11-2000), 2011 WL 2687930, at *3 (3d Cir. July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for Appel-
lants]. 
 29 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *2. 
 30 See id. at *2. On September 12, 2008, Anderson boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened 
her. Id. At the football game that evening, Anderson elbowed Brittany in the throat. Id. Days later, 
Anderson’s friend, Abbey Harris, struck Emily in the throat. Id. All of these incidents were reported to 
Assistant Principal Balaski. Brief for Appellants, supra note 28, at 6. 
 31 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *2. 
 32 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 163; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *1. In addition, the Morrows 
brought a supplemental state law claim for negligence and/or gross negligence or willful misconduct 
against the school district and Balaski. Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *1. Notably, there was no fear 
of tort liability in Morrow due to Pennsylvania’s immunity statute. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 8541 (West 2007) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable 
for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agen-
cy or an employee thereof of any other person.”); see also Morrow III, 719 F.3d. at 183–84 (Smith, J., 
concurring) (noting that states are allowed to create their own statutory scheme for imposing liability 
on schools for not protecting students from harm). 
 33 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 166; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863 at *1; Brief for Appellants, supra 
note 28, at 6. 
 34 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 28, at 7. 
 35 Id. at 7–8. 
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state did not have a duty to protect the Morrows.36 The district court dismissed 
the Morrows’ complaint with prejudice, finding that that no special relation-
ship existed between the Morrows and the school, and that the state-created 
danger theory did not apply.37 
On appeal, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the school did not 
have a duty to protect and thus affirmed the district court’s decision.38 The 
court reasoned that the school did not have a special relationship with the Mor-
rows because the Morrows remained dependent on their parents.39 Moreover, 
the school did not create or increase their risk of danger because the school’s 
decisions to permit Anderson to return to school and to ignore its own discipli-
nary procedures were not affirmative acts.40 On September 3, 2013, the Mor-
rows filed a petition to the Supreme Court to request review of the Third Cir-
cuit decision.41 On December 16, 2013, the petition was denied.42 
II. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY 
Despite the Third Circuit’s holding that the school had no duty to protect 
the Morrows, the court was not unanimous regarding whether the special rela-
tionship or state-created danger exceptions applied.43 Section A of this Part 
discusses the majority’s reasoning for, and the dissent’s arguments against, 
finding no special relationship between the Morrows and the school.44 Section 
B of this Part examines the majority’s reasoning for, and the dissent’s argu-
ments against, finding that the school took no affirmative action that increased 
the risk of harm to the Morrows.45 
A. Special Relationship 
In Morrow, the Third Circuit concluded that a special relationship did not 
exist between the public school and the Morrows and thus the state did not 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *3. 
 37 Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 165; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at 5–7. The district court also denied 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at 6–7. 
 38 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 165, 179. Prior to Morrow III, the Third Circuit had reordered a 
hearing en banc. Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow II), 685 F.3d 1126, 1126 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 39 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 170–71, 173–74. 
 40 See id. at 177–78. 
 41 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 25. 
 42 Morrow IV, 134 S. Ct. at 825. 
 43 Compare Morrow III, 719 F.3d 160, 165, 173–74, 177–79 (3d Cir.) (holding that neither the 
special relationship nor state-created danger exceptions applied), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013), 
with id. at 188–89, 193–94 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the school did have a special rela-
tionship with the Morrows and that the state-created danger exception applied). 
 44 See infra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
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have a duty to protect the students from Anderson.46 A duty to protect did not 
arise, according to the court, because the school’s authority during school 
hours did not place a restriction on the Morrows’ freedom to provide for their 
own well-being.47 The court reasoned that the Morrows remained dependent 
on their parents to meet their basic needs, and the school’s authority over them 
during school hours did not usurp their parents’ ultimate authority.48 Moreover, 
the court reasoned that states are better suited to provide protection and reme-
dies for students through tort claims and the political process rather than 
through § 1983 claims.49 
Dissenting in Morrow, Judge Julio Fuentes argued that a special relation-
ship did exist between the school and the Morrows because the school had suf-
ficiently restricted the Morrows’ liberty to the extent the students could not 
care for themselves during the school day.50 Although parents retain ultimate 
custody over their child, their authority is limited while the child is in school.51 
Moreover, as indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court, a special relationship can 
exist even if the state does not have complete physical custody of an individu-
al.52 As such, the dissent analogized the Morrows’ situation to a foster care 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 169–71, 172–73. To reach this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied 
on the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices, the Court’s 1995 decision Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, as well as the 1992 U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit case D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School. See id. 
at 167–74 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 654–55 (1995); DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93, 199–200 (1989); D.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366, 1371–72, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 47 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 168; see also DeShaney, 489 U.S at 200 (explaining that the re-
straint of the individual’s freedom to act on her own behalf amounts to a violation of due process); 
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366, 1371–73, 1376 (rejecting the argument that the school had a duty to 
protect two female students from assault by male students because their parents remained their prima-
ry caretakers and the children remained residents of the their homes). 
 48 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 170–71, 173–74. According to the court, a school’s restrictions on 
students in general and those in this particular case are different in kind from the restrictions placed on 
prisoners, institutionalized patients, or children in foster care. See id. For example, unlike prisons, 
schools need parent permission to administer medical treatment. See id. at 173. 
 49 See id. at 176–77; id. at 183–84 (Smith, J., concurring) (writing separately to note when a prior 
en banc decision can be overruled). But see Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect 
Between Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. 
REV. 641, 666 (2004) [hereinafter Bullying in Schools] (noting that immunity from tort liability pro-
tects schools from any liability for decisions they make). 
 50 See id. at 188 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see also id. at 185 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (agreeing that a special relationship existed but arguing that the state did not make 
an affirmative act). 
 51 See id. at 190–91 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (explaining that parents cannot withdraw their student 
from school except in very limited and egregious circumstances). The dissent described restrictions that 
the school places on students during the school day, such as prohibiting cell phones and regulating behav-
ior in school buses, the cafeteria, and sporting activities. See id.; see also Bullying in Schools, supra note 
49, at 666. 
 52 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (“[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s 
freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint 
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placement, where a child still exercises freedom but is also still dependent on 
the state.53 Ultimately, Judge Fuentes concluded that the state’s compulsory 
attendance laws, the no contact orders, the school’s custody of all the students 
involved, and the school’s “No Tolerance” policy together restricted the girls’ 
ability to protect themselves.54 
B. State-Created Danger Theory 
The Morrow court held that even though the defendants allowed Ander-
son to return to school, that action did not create any risk of harm to the Mor-
rows that would give rise to a constitutional duty to protect.55 A state’s action 
creates danger that causes harm to an individual when the state’s affirmative 
action rendered the individual more vulnerable than if the state had not acted.56 
The court reasoned that the school’s decisions not to implement its disciplinary 
procedure and to allow Anderson to return to school were not affirmative 
acts.57 If all decisions not to act were construed as affirmative acts, the court 
explained, it would be difficult to limit to the exception.58 
                                                                                                                           
of personal liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process 
Clause . . . .”); Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 188–90, 192 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (arguing that DeShaney 
did not create a complete physical custody requirement for a special relationship). 
 53 Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 191–92 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see Mary Kate Kearney, DeShaney’s 
Legacy in Foster Care and Public School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 284 (2002) (explaining 
that foster care isolates children from other means of protection, which makes them dependent on the 
state); see also Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that foster children and 
prisoners are similar because both depend on the state for their daily needs). 
 54 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 187–88, 191, 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see also Nicini, 212 
F.3d at 808. Alternatively, the dissent argued that the Third Circuit should have found that a special 
relationship existed because the court did not necessarily need to rely on its precedent in Middle Bucks 
due to that decision’s flawed reasoning. See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 195–96 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); 
see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (explaining that an en banc court may, upon review, set aside its own precedent when the hold-
ing was fundamentally flawed). According to the dissent, the DeShaney court did not hold that the 
creation of a duty through a special relationship requires complete physical custody, rather it provided 
non-exhaustive examples of restrictions that qualified as a special relationship. See Morrow III, 719 
F.3d at 195 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see also Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) 
(articulating that the majority read DeShaney too narrowly). 
 55 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 178–79 (majority opinion) (rejecting the Morrows’ argument that 
failing to expel Anderson or letting her board the Morrows’ school were affirmative actions). 
 56 See id. at 167, 177; Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2006) (em-
phasizing that the fourth element requires an affirmative act, not merely a failure to act); Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that there was a state-created danger because 
the police officers’ affirmative acts of detaining a woman, sending her husband home, and then leav-
ing her to walk home intoxicated created the situation that led to her injuries). 
 57 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 178–79. A school that ignores bullying or takes ineffective 
measures in response to it will not meet the state-created danger theory criteria because the state has 
not made the situation worse. See Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 669. According to the court, 
Anderson’s suspension, while an affirmative act, did not increase the danger to the Morrows. See 
Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 178–79. Additionally, the court concluded that the decisions not to expel An-
derson and to allow her to board the Morrows’ school bus—despite the no contact order—only indi-
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Despite these concerns, Judge Fuentes’s dissent argued that the school’s 
decision constituted an affirmative act and thus the Morrows had a claim under 
the state-created danger theory.59 Judge Fuentes viewed the affirmative action 
requirement as assessing whether the state increased the risk of harm, regard-
less of whether the state took an affirmative action or merely decided whether 
to use its authority.60 In this case, an affirmative action that increased the risk 
of harm could be inferred because the school used discretion in allowing An-
derson to return to school.61 As a result of the school’s decision to violate its 
own disciplinary procedures, the girls were at an increased risk of danger, 
thereby triggering an affirmative duty for the school to protect them.62 
III. A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SCHOOL AND ITS STUDENTS 
A school should be constitutionally liable when children are unable to 
protect themselves from harm, in particular bullying from other students.63 Be-
cause parents do not have the ability to adequately provide for their children’s 
safety while at school, this responsibility should be imposed on the adults to 
                                                                                                                           
cate that the school failed to take any affirmative action. See id. Similarly, other federal appeals courts 
have refused to construe school inaction as an affirmative act. See, e.g., Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 
298, 312 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a guidance counselor’s failure to act to prevent a student’s 
suicide is not an affirmative act); McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 465–66 (6th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that a teacher leaving her students unattended was not an affirmative act that creat-
ed or increased the risk of harm). 
 58 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 178 (reasoning that if the court were to accept that the decisions to 
take one action over another or to take no action at all were affirmative acts, the “state-created danger 
exception would swallow the rule”). 
 59 See id. at 201 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 60 See id. at 199 (arguing that the decision not to act is an affirmative use of authority); see also 
Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 669 (suggesting that a school’s failure to act actually encourages 
harassment in schools). Notably, one court following the Third Circuit’s formulation of the state-
created danger theory found the theory satisfied where a school official threatened disciplinary action 
if a female student defended herself from attacks by male students. See Carroll K. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. 
Of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1998). 
 61 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 200 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the school admitted 
during oral argument that the principal could have, but did not, initiate the process to expel Anderson). 
 62 See id. at 200–01 (criticizing the majority for dismissing the argument, without explanation, 
that the school’s deviation from its disciplinary code is an affirmative act). 
 63 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); Morrow III, 
719 F.3d 160, 188 (3d Cir.) (Fuentes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013); see also Bul-
lying in Schools, supra note 49, at 666 (acknowledging that significant restrictions are placed on stu-
dents during the school day and that parents cannot always afford to homeschool or transfer their child 
to a private school to avoid harm). See generally You’re on Your Own, Kid, supra note 14, at 1083–94 
(arguing that courts should impose a duty on schools to reduce and prevent bullying). The ineffective-
ness of state bullying laws further supports that children need constitutional protection. Samantha 
Neiman et al., Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 638–39, 644–48 (2012) (finding no 
significant difference between the prevalence of bullying based on the presence of state anti-bullying 
legislation or based on the severity of state anti-bullying laws). 
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whom parents have given temporary authority.64 Finding that a special rela-
tionship exists between the school and its students in certain instances will in-
spire greater care in the drafting of school policies and, in the case of bullying, 
more attention to improving a school’s social climate instead of merely react-
ing to incidents.65 Ultimately, utilizing the special relationship exception will 
compel schools to tend to the safety of their students, regardless of whether 
they contributed to the danger.66 
In contrast, the state-created danger theory should not be used to establish 
a duty to protect due to the difficulty in determining whether a school took an 
affirmative action.67 To construe inaction generally as an action would too 
greatly expand the state-created danger exception, causing schools to take se-
vere action against student misconduct out of fear of liability.68 The facts in 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 190, 194 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). Using special relationships be-
tween students and teachers to broaden a student’s constitutional right would work similarly to using 
special relationships to diminish other constitutional rights—to promote a safer school environment. 
See, e.g., Shade v. City of Farmington, Minnesota, 309 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The nature 
of administrators’ and teachers’ responsibilities for the students entrusted to their care, not school 
boundary lines, render the Fourth Amendment standard in the public-school context less onerous.”); 
M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (identifying that teachers have a unique relationship 
with their students with regard to discipline and protection while in their care and custody, which 
justifies greater flexibility when applying the Fourth Amendment in a school setting); Harriet A. 
Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction Over Stu-
dents’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV 1563, 1571 (2009) (noting that schools can limit a student’s 
First Amendment freedom of speech rights because schools are obligated to provide safe learning 
environments). 
 65 See Neiman, supra note 63, at 616–17 (explaining that immediate disciplinary action in re-
sponse to bullying, such as zero tolerance policies, are not adequate long-term solutions because suc-
cessful bullying intervention programs incorporate skills training, counseling, and mediation); Julie 
Sacks & Robert S. Salem, Victims Without Legal Remedies: Why Kids Need Schools to Develop Com-
prehensive Anti-Bullying Policies, 72 ALB. L. REV. 147, 152–53 & n.25 (2009) (arguing that “zero 
tolerance” policies and systems of progressive discipline fail to stop bullying because they focus on 
the misconduct rather than the community prejudices that cause the victim to be vulnerable); see also 
Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 700. 
 66 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 202 (Fuentes, J. dissenting) (explaining that when the state inter-
feres with a child’s ability to protect themselves, the state should be seen as responsible for protecting 
the child). 
 67 See id. at 186 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also, e.g., Sanford v. 
Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 312 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a guidance counselor’s failure to act to pre-
vent a student’s suicide is not an affirmative act); McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch. 433 F.3d 460, 465–
66 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a teacher leaving her students unattended was not an affirmative 
act that created or increased the risk of harm). 
 68 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 186 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 679 (explaining that “zero tolerance” policies’ lack of propor-
tionality and reasonableness can lead to expulsion and suspension instead of educating offenders 
about their actions). In Morrow, Pennsylvania’s immunity statute insulated the school from tort liabil-
ity. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (West 2007). Although there are strong benefits to this legis-
lative choice, it still leaves students and parents like the Morrows without recourse. See Bullying in 
Schools, supra note 49, at 683 (explaining that immunity protects the state treasury from being inun-
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Morrow illustrate the inadequacies of the state-created danger theory, as it is 
difficult to characterize the school’s decision not to enforce its own misconduct 
policy as an affirmative action.69 Nevertheless, the school’s decision can be 
incorporated into the special relationship analysis because it further restricted 
the Morrows’ liberty.70 
Courts should therefore recognize a special relationship between a school 
and its students when the school imposes restrictions that limit students’ ability 
to protect themselves.71 Because children become dependent on the school to 
provide for their safety during the school day, the limits imposed on the free-
dom of the students to act on their own behalf should give rise to a duty to pro-
tect under the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Although compulsory attendance and 
a school’s in loco parentis authority is not enough to create the duty to protect, 
situations such as a school’s failure to adhere to a no tolerance policy for bully-
ing can place a much greater restriction on the ability of students to provide for 
their own needs.73 These types of conditions create student dependence on a 
                                                                                                                           
dated by damage awards and relieves school officials’ fear of liability for their decisions, but leaves 
parents without remedies when students are harmed). 
 69 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 185–86 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rea-
soning that the fourth prong of the state-created danger test distinguishes between when the state 
could have done more to protect an individual and when the state actually increased or created the 
danger); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (reasoning that if citizens want a system that imposes 
liability when the state fails to act, they may create one through tort law, but liability cannot be im-
posed by the Court’s expansion of due process); Sanford, 456 F.3d at 312 (holding that failure to act to 
prevent a suicide is not an affirmative act); McQueen, 433 F.3d at 465–66 (concluding leaving stu-
dents unattended is not an affirmative act); Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 670 (concluding that 
courts will likely not find fault with the school in bullying cases when officials fail to act). 
 70 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 186 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explain-
ing that the school’s decision not to act is more relevant to the special relationship exception). But see 
Carroll K. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (reasoning that 
plaintiff’s state-created danger theory claim survived a motion to dismiss because of the school’s hos-
tile environment toward females and the principal’s statements to a female student that she could not 
defend herself against physical attacks by male students). 
 71 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 171 (“[W]e do not foreclose the possibility of a special relationship 
arising between a particular school and particular students under certain unique and narrow circum-
stances.”); id. at 188, 190–91 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech-
nical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372–73 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Fourteenth Amendment Duty to Protect—
Third Circuit Holds That State Has No Duty to Protect Schoolchildren from Bullying Under the Spe-
cial Relationship or State-Created Danger Exceptions—Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 811, 816–18 (2013) (arguing that the Third Circuit should have found a special relationship 
between states and school children). 
 72 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 188 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 172–73 (majority opinion) 
(quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). The court conceded that the school’s knowledge of the no con-
tact orders and the specific incidents may be enough to establish that the school violated an existing 
duty to protect the Morrows, but held that it is not enough to create the duty. See id. at 173 (majority 
opinion). 
 73 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808–09 (3d Cir. 2000) (reasoning that children in foster care are 
dependent on the state to meet their basic needs even though they enjoy greater freedom than prison-
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school for daily needs and thus are similar to restrictions found in a foster care 
or independent living care situation, where courts have found a special rela-
tionship.74   
Furthermore, finding that a school has a constitutional duty to protect stu-
dents when their ability to protect themselves is restricted will prevent students 
from taking matters into their own hands when faced with a bully.75 Given the 
prevalence of bullying and state anti-bullying measures, schools should have 
an affirmative duty to protect children from private violence.76 Moreover, the 
factual development of other liberty restricting measures over students during 
the school day supports a finding of such an affirmative duty.77 Schools are 
exhibiting greater control over students with the development of technology 
that further limits their ability to provide for their own protection.78 
                                                                                                                           
ers); Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 174. In Morrow, the school’s “No Tolerance Policy” and decision not to 
expel Anderson, despite two no contact orders, placed a much greater restriction on the ability of the 
girls to provide for their own needs. See 719 F.3d at 187–88, 191, 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see 
also Nicini, 212 F.3d at 808. 
 74 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 191–93 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Smith, 413 F.3d at 95–96; Nicini, 
212 F.3d at 808–09; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) (indicating that, after 
taking an individual into custody, there is a duty to control the conduct of third parties if the actor has 
reason to know of their ability to control such conduct and has reason to know of the necessity and 
opportunity for control of third parties). 
 75 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 187–88 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 
(Sloviter, J., dissenting). According to one commentator:  
In effect, the state has created for the child a property interest in a free education, com-
pelled her to avail herself of it, and then has acquired no duty to protect either that 
property interest or her liberty interest in bodily integrity, at least so far as those inter-
ests are threatened by others who themselves have been brought into her life by state 
compulsion. 
Bullying in Schools, supra note 49, at 670; see also Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps 
Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html?pagewanted=all (describing 
twelve-year old girl who committed suicide after being cyberbullied). 
 76 See Neiman, supra note 63 at 628 (noting that as of November 2010, forty-five states have laws 
addressing school bullying); SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2011, at v (2012), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs
2012/2012002rev.pdf (noting that in 2009, 39% of sixth graders, 33% of seventh graders, 32% of 
eighth graders, 28% of ninth graders, 27% of tenth graders, 21% of eleventh graders, and 28% of 
twelfth graders reported being bullied at school); VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES 47–48 (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/
rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf (noting that forty-one states have 
model bullying policies or guidelines for school districts). 
 77 See Morrow III, 719 F.3d at 195–96 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (explaining that schools exercise 
greater control over students through electronic tracking of their movements, monitoring social media, 
and locking classrooms). 
 78 See id.; Stephen Ceasar & Howard Blume, To Lock Classroom Doors or Not?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/13/local/la-me-school-security-20130114 (describing 
that some schools require classrooms to be locked while others leave it to the discretion of the admin-
istrators and teachers); Maurice Chammah & Nick Swartsell, Student IDs That Track the Students, 
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CONCLUSION 
A school should have a constitutional duty to protect its students during 
the school day when restrictions at school prevent its students from protecting 
themselves. When a school restricts students’ liberty, the students become de-
pendent on the school to meet their needs, which creates a special relationship. 
The Third Circuit in Morrow v. Balaski should have found a special relation-
ship between the school and the Morrows because the students were dependent 
on the school to meet their needs when the school did not enforce its own dis-
ciplinary policy. 
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